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Introduction
In my contribution I will provide an outline of how two major strands in Löb-
ner’s work can be combined in a dynamic game-theoretical semantics: phase
quantiVcation (PQ) and frame theory (FT). In a Vrst step a formal analysis of
PQ in (dynamic) arrow logic is presented. Based on this analysis it is shown in
the second step that frame theory must not be understood as being an alternative
to standard Tarskian semantics. Rather it must be seen as an extension of such
a semantics. The extension developed in this contribution combines the formal
frame theory developed in Petersen (2007) with the analysis of PQ in arrow logic
developed in this paper. In contrast to other dynamic formalisms like Dynamic
Predicate Logic, the dynamic aspect is already located in the lexicon. For example,
although adjectives like ‘late’ are basically interpreted as properties of states, they
admit in addition of an interpretation where they denote relations between states
(or, to be precise, basic frames representing partial descriptions of objects in the
sense of Löbner 2012, 2014 and Petersen 2007).
The paper is organized as follows: In sections 1 and 2 the empirical data used by
Löbner for his account of PQ as well as counterexamples discussed in Mittwoch
(1993) are presented. In section 3 the formal analysis of PQ in Arrow Logic is
developed. In the Vnal section it is outlined how this formal analysis can be used
to arrive at a satisfying formal theory of frames.
1 Phase quantiVcation as a major module in natural
language semantics
According to Löbner (1987, 1989, 1999), quantiVcation in natural language is not
restricted to the semantics of noun phrases but applies to a wide range of semantic
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phenomena including for instance adverbs of quantiVcation like already or still,
intensiVers like too and enough, scalar adjectives like few (small) and many (big)
and phasal verbs like begin, continue and stop. Some examples are given in (1).
(1) a. He sometimes/always/never manages to be friendly.
b. In China you can buy Coca-Cola somewhere/everywhere/nowhere.
c. The dollar is already/still/not yet/no longer high.
d. This house is big enough/too big for us.
e. In the weather forecast they said it will continue to rain/start raining/stop
raining.
Löbner is aware of the fact that traditionally the above examples are not normally
covered by the term ‘quantiVcation’. However, according to him, this term never-
theless refers to a seemingly very comprehensive range of phenomena which are
syntactically and grammatically rather diverse but semantically closely enough
related to form a class of their own (Löbner 1987: 53). Löbner refers to this broad-
ened view of quantiVcation as phase quantiVcation (PQ). PQ is characterized by
the following Vve constraints: (i) the interpretation of PQ expressions is always
based on a (monotone) scale. This scale is either temporal (the time line in the
case of the already-group) or non-temporal, i. e. a dimension like width or height
(scalar adjectives);1 (ii) PQ-expressions contain an implicit parameter which mod-
els a particular perspective taken by the speaker; (iii) semantically, these ex-
pressions take two arguments: a predicate P which deVnes a positive phase or
range of values on the scale and the parameter from (ii); (iv) sentences containing
PQ-expressions are about admissible developments which are deVned in terms of
two adjacent phases (called a “double-phase”) on the underlying scale. The two
phases diUer with respect to the fact of whether the truth conditions imposed
by the predicate are satisVed on them (positive) or not (negative); (v) the exis-
tence of an admissible development is a presupposition of sentences containing
a PQ-expression.
These constraints are best explained by means of an example. Consider schon
(‘already’).2
1 The use of schon is not restricted to temporal uses, as shown by (i).
(i) Basel liegt schon in der Schweiz.
Löbner (1987: 81) interprets (i) as follows: “Walk along any relevant path to Basel and you will cross
the border of Switzerland.”
2 This use of schon is only one of three diUerent uses of this expression distinguished by Löbner; see
below for details.
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(2) a. Es
It
ist
is
schon
already
spät.
late
b. Es
It
ist
is
spät.
late
In this case the scale is the time line and the parameter point is a temporal ref-
erence point t. The logical expression is ‘schon(t,late)’ and an admissible develop-
ment (or interval) consists of a phase during which it is not late followed by a
second phase during which it is late. The parameter point t is required to fall into
the second (positive) phase. Figure 1 is a pictorial representation of an admissible
interval. The truth conditions for ‘schon(t,P)’ are given in (3).
t
not-p p
========
noch nicht schon
Figure 1
(3) Truth conditions for ‘schon(t,P)’
a. ‘schon(t,P)’ triggers the presupposition that there is a phase of not-P
starting before t and that up to t at most one change between not-P and
P occurred.
b. ‘schon(t,P)’ is true iU the presupposition in (a) is satisVed and P(t) is
true.
c. ‘schon(t,P)’ is false iU the presupposition in (a) is satisVed and P(t) is
false.
d. If the presupposition in (a) is not satisVed, ‘schon(t,P)’ is undeVned.
The presuppositions of the already-group are displayed in (4), where ‘ñ’ means
presupposes.
(4) a. schon p at tñ not p before t
b. noch p at tñ p before t
c. noch nicht p at tñ not p before t
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In what exactly does the semantic contribution of expressions like already con-
sists? Or, more generally, what is the innovative feature of PQ? Let’s consider
another example.
(5) a. Das
The
Licht
light
ist
is
an.
on.
b. Das
The
Licht
light
ist
is
schon
already
an.
on.
According to Löbner (1999: 51), modifying spät with schon “adds a sense of tem-
poral dynamics”. He comments: “While (5a) is a stative predication about the
implicit evaluation time t, sentence (5b) represents the same state as the result of
a development from a previous state of aUairs with the light not on to the present
state with the light now on.” The notion of “temporal dynamics” is explained in
terms of a presupposition. (5b) presupposes that the light was not on some time
before t, i. e. (5a) was false on a relevant interval before t. By contrast, for (5a) no
such presupposition is triggered. For Löbner, this has the eUect that the meaning
of a sentence involving a PQ-expression cannot be reduced to its truth conditions.
In addition to the truth conditional dimension such expressions have both a pro-
cedural (or dynamic) and a cognitive dimension. Expressions involving phase
quantiVcation require information about the way in which the truth conditions
came about. Löbner illustrates this view by the following procedural deVnition
of ‘schon spät’: one starts from within the Vrst (negative) semiphase, no matter
where but, say, from its leftmost point. Next, one runs along the scale until one
reaches the parameter point, which is required to lie in the double phase, and
checks whether one is in the second (positive) semiphase. The conceptual dimen-
sion is described by Löbner as follows: in order to process and comprehend a
sentence containing a PQ-expression, a speaker has to have the concept of the
diUerent admissible cases because otherwise (s)he is not able to mentally process
its propositional content. As Löbner (1989: 180) notes: “Making sense of any such
sentence means constructing a speciVc alternative on the basis of the alternative
cases as a Vrst step, and only then, as a second step, checking (or registering, or
asking, or whatever) which alternative applies.”
Empirical evidence for this analysis comes from data like the following (Löbner
1989: 181f.).
(6) a. Zwei plus zwei ist #schon/#noch vier.
b. Sie ist #schon/#noch nicht jung/Jungfrau.
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c. Sie ist #noch/#nicht mehr alt.
d. Es ist schon/#noch spät.
e. Es ist #schon/noch früh.
Common to all examples in (6) is the fact that it is not possible to construct the
required succession of two diUerent phases, either a positive phase followed by a
negative one or vice versa. (6a) is an example of an ‘eternal’ or timeless state-
ment. (6b) and (6c) show that for temporally contingent statements, all irre-
versible states are incompatible with the perspective presupposed by noch, and
conversely schon excludes those states which cannot be preceded by a contrary
state. (6d) and (6e) are not admissible because the underlying scale is ordered
by früh ă spät. From this it follows that there is no phase of lateness preced-
ing früh and no phase of earliness following spät. Thus, for both sentences the
presupposition is not satisVed.
Löbner (1989: 182) hypothesizes that the sentences in (6) are refuted already at
a level of conceptual analysis which precedes any reference to actual situations. To
quote Löbner: “To put it in terms of the analysis suggested: in these cases we
know by the very conceptual content of the sentence that the set of admissible
cases is degenerate.” (Löbner 1989: 182)
1.1 Standard quantiVcation and phase quantiVcation
In contrast to Generalized QuantiVer Theory (GQT), Löbner analyzes standard
quantiVers like all or some not solely in terms of set-theoretic relations. For
example, on the GQT view the meaning of a quantiVer Q(P) can be described
as follows: Q(P) is true just in case P is an element of the denotation of Q. This
view is criticized by Löbner on the following ground: “Such a picture is natural in
a semantic framework which has in view the truth conditions of sentences and
does not consider the way truth or falsity comes about.” (Löbner 1987: 79) The
advantage of a procedural semantics is primarily seen in the fact that it provides
criteria to choose among alternative formulations of truth conditions which are
equivalent when viewed from their results but not from the way they come about.
Standard quantiVers can be analyzed as an instance of phase quantiVcation
in the following way. Using the fact that quantiVers live on their domain of
quantiVcation, it follows that no other elements of the domain are relevant for the
evaluation procedure. If one assumes in addition that the domain of quantiVcation
is Vnite, it is possible to deVne a linear order on the elements the quantiVer lives
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on so that those elements which have a certain property (say the property of
being human) come Vrst. If deVned in this way, the sentence Some A are P is
analyzed similarly to a sentence with schon: “start with elements of A for which
P does not hold (if there are any), run through A, and you will eventually enter
P, or, shorter, A reaches into P” (Löbner 1987: 81). In Löbner (1987) this idea of
relating standard quantiVcation to phase quantiVcation is made more precise in
terms of semantic automata.
1.2 Phase quantiVcation and semantic automata
In Van Benthem (1986) the following two theorems are proved (see also Sevenster
2006 for details).
(7) a. The Vrst-order deVnable quantiVers are precisely those which can be
recognized by permutation-invariant acyclic Vnite state machines.
b. The Vrst-order additively deVnable quantiVers are precisely those
which can be recognized by push-down automata.
In the second theorem Vrst-order additive logic is Vrst-order logic extended with
the ternary + relation and two constants a and b. The constant a is interpreted
as the number of zeros and b as the number of ones. Formulas in this extension of
FOL, then, are statements from standard arithmetic. According to these theorems,
quantiVers like all, some or at least are recognized by acyclic Vnite state automata
whereas quantiVers like an even number of require for their recognition Vnite state
automata with loops. The relation to natural language semantics is described by
Van Benthem (1986: 151) as follows: “Viewed procedurally, the quantiVer has to
decide which truth value to give when presented with an enumeration of the
individuals in the universe of discourse marked for their (non-)membership of A
and B.” Below in Figures 2 and 3 the two automata for computing all and some
are depicted.
YES NO
1
0
0,1
Figure 2
By unfolding such an automaton, one gets a tree (assuming that there is a
unique initial state) of possible runs (or computations) (see e. g. Khoussainov &
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NO YES
0
1
1,0
Figure 3
Nerode 2001 and Hollenberg 1998 for details). The automaton begins its run at
the initial state, which is the root of the tree, and proceeds until it either reaches
an accepting or a refuting state. Thus, edges of the tree correspond to possible
moves (or behaviour) of the automaton while reading the input.
A relation between semantic automata and PQ is established by Löbner
(1987: 82) in the following way. The automata in Figures 2 and 3 can be con-
sidered as representing a simple notion of border-crossing, either from p to not-p
or from not-p to p. The automaton for all can also be used for representing noch
(‘still’): “Start from a given, contextually determined point t’ where p holds (e. g.
p = früh with YES the accepting state) and keep to it as long as you stay in p, but
change irreversibly to the refuting state NO as soon as you encounter a time at
which not-p holds, (e. g. at which it is no longer early).” However, as conceded by
Löbner, these automata fail to capture the presupposition triggered by elements
of the schon-group. He suggests that presuppositions can be modeled by indeter-
ministic automata that are deVned for the relevant input only, yielding no truth
value (i. e. neither true nor false) if the presupposition is not satisVed. One for-
mal possibility of deVning this idea, alluded to by Löbner (1987: 83), consists in
deVning presuppositions as additional automata that are ‘inserted’ as subroutines
into automata like those in the two Vgures above, calculating the truth value of
a corresponding sentence.
2 Some problems for phase quantiVcation
There are a number of critical points that can be put forward against Löbner’s
arguments for PQ. First, as observed by several authors, there are empirical coun-
terexamples to central claims of PQ. On the theoretical side one has to mention
that so far Löbner has never tried to formalize the above ideas, except for the
short comparison to the concept of semantic automata explained above in section
1.2, and that the relation between SQ and PQ is not as neat as Löbner takes it.
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2.1 Empirical adequacy
Mittwoch (1993) noted that there are obvious empirical counterexamples to the
presuppositions in (4).
(8) a. He/she is already rich.
b. The easy movement of the couplet is already there.
c. The Smiths have had a baby girl; they already have two sons.
These examples show that the existence of a negative phase is not a necessary
condition for schon (or ‘already’) to be admissible. (8a) can be used in a situation in
which a baby is born who has come into an inheritance at birth. (8b) is appropriate
to express a verdict about a poet’s very Vrst work. Finally, what makes already
appropriate in (8c) is not the existence of a phase in which the Smiths had no
children, but rather the contrast between the situation in which they only had
two sons and the present situation (Mittwoch 1993: 75). According to Mittwoch
(1993: 75), (6a) and (6b) are unacceptable solely due to the pragmatic meaning
of schon or already. This meaning involves temporal comparison of some kind.
Whereas in (8a) it is comparison with some norm: one can be richer earlier than
other people who attain riches, the state of being young referred to in (6b) starts
at birth for everybody. Similar counter-examples can be found for the pair noch
nicht and noch.
(9) a. Peters Augen waren noch nicht braun, als er geboren wurde.
b. # Peters Augen waren noch blau, als er geboren wurde.
As noted by Mittwoch (1993: 76), there is a striking diUerence in acceptability be-
tween (9a) and (9b). If (9a) were simply a case of inner negation of noch, it should
be as odd as (9b). However, (9b) is odd precisely because it suggests that Peter had
blue eyes before his birth, which, though undoubtedly true, is irrelevant. This im-
plication is rather due to the presupposition of noch. By contrast, (9a) lacks this
implication. As a consequence, there is no need to speculate about the prenatal
colour of Peter’s eyes. Mittwoch concludes that the combination of noch nicht is
not normally fully compositional and that it lacks the presuppositional meaning
component of noch. Sentences with ‘noch nicht’ do not require a preceding phase
of not-p. However, as noted by Mittwoch (1993: 76), there are counter-examples
to (9b).
(10) a. Als Taschenrechner neu auf den Markt kamen, waren sie noch ziemlich
teuer.
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b. Als Taschenrechner neu auf den Markt kamen, kosteten sie noch 400 DM.
A third set of counterexamples concerns the second and third type of uses of
‘schon’ distinguished by Löbner.
(11) a. Peter hat schon drei Seiten gelesen.
b. Peter hat drei Seiten gelesen.
In this use schon focuses on a time-dependent predicate. For example, in (11a) the
predicate in focus is drei Seiten and indicates the amount of text read so far by
Peter (Löbner 1999: 48). According to Löbner, the amount of material read at the
parameter point t is a time-dependent function f. The meaning of (11a) can then
be paraphrased as ‘at t, f is already three pages’. When viewed as an instance
of PQ, the predicate p is ‘f is three pages’. Reading being a cumulative process
(the amount of material read increases continuously with time), the negation of
p, not-p, is equivalent to ‘f is less than three pages’. Thus, if p is true, then there is
a (negative) phase preceding the phase at which p is true at which not-p is true.
However, exactly the same argument is true for the unmodiVed sentence (11b).
In the third type of use distinguished by Löbner, the time adverbial in focus
speciVes the normally implicit evaluation time tn.
(12) a. Peter war schon gestern da.
b. Peter war gestern da, ja er war (sogar) schon die ganze Woche da.
Similarly to the case of (11a), the admissibility of (12a) does not require a preced-
ing phase of not-p, as shown by the example (12b).
2.2 The relation between standard quantiVcation and
phase quantiVcation
Löbner’s claim that standard quantiVcation involving all or some is similar to
proper PQ is open to criticism. First, there is an asymmetry between the standard
(FOL) quantiVers all and some on the one hand and modiVers like schon and noch
on the other. For example, whereas some only requires there to be an element that
is in the denotation of A and of B, schon requires something stronger: in addition
to ‘late(t)’, there must be a(n initial) preceding phase in the given admissible inter-
val where ‘late(t)’ is false. Thus, for all and some there is only one way of how the
truth conditions can be brought about. For all, one has to show for all elements of
the domain (or a given context set) that they satisfy a particular condition (say,
being mortal if being human). In the case of some one gets: Vnd some element
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which satisVes the property. In this respect the quantiVers are similar to unmod-
iVed late, which requires only a simple test to show either its truth or falsity at
a given point in time. It is only by modifying this adjective with already (or still in
the case of early) that one gets “a sense of dynamic development”. By contrast,
this component is absent in the case of the two quantiVers. Second, in contrast to
cases involving elements of the schon group there is in general no presupposition
in the case of quantiVers. For both All humans are mortal and Some students come
from Italy, there are no corresponding sentences that can be said to ‘add a sense
of dynamics’ triggering a presupposition similar to that of schon in the case of
schon spät. Thus, there are no pairs corresponding to Es ist spät und Es ist schon
spät. Rather, quantiVed sentences simply correspond to the unmodiVed form of
spät.3 Third, Löbner’s assumption that the domain of quantiVcation can always
be linearly ordered in such a way that elements having a certain property, say
coming from Italy, are Vrst in the ordering is artiVcial and, as admitted by Löbner,
violates the condition of permutational invariance (i. e. the truth of a quantiVed
sentence is not dependent on a particular order on the domain of quantiVcation)
for those quantiVers.4
3 An alternative interpretation of phase quantiVcation
If there really is any concept of phase quantiVcation, it must be possible to an-
alyze standard quantiVcation and phase quantiVcation as instances of a general
quantiVcational scheme. I will suggest, building on results from Van Benthem &
Alechina (1997), that there is indeed such a general scheme.
3.1 QuantiVers as modal operators
In GQT, a monadic generalized quantiVer Q is interpreted as a set of subsets of
the domain in such a way that in a modelM the formula Qxφ is true just in case
the set of elements which satisfy φ belongs to the interpretation of the quantiVer.
For the existential quantiVer one gets that it is interpreted as the set of all non-
empty subsets of the domainD underlyingM . Similarly, the universal quantiVer
3 See below for details on this point.
4 From this it does not follow that the property of being ordered is cognitively unimportant, as
shown by the following example. In a paper-and-pencil experiment Szymanik & Zajenkowski (2010)
showed that on ordered domains processing sentences with the quantiVer most is easier than on
unordered domains. The reaction times of people participating in the experiment were signiVcantly
faster if the domain was ordered compared to the same sentence on unordered domains.
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is interpreted as the singleton set containing only D. As shown in Van Benthem
& Alechina (1997), quantiVers can also be interpreted as a special form of modal
operators. Consider the Tarskian truth condition for the existential quantiVer (for
α “ d or α “ y, αÑ is a sequence of objects or variables, respectively).
(13) M, rdÑ{yÑs |ù Dxφpx, yÑq iU there exists a d P D with
M, rd{x, dÑ{yÑs |ù φpx, yÑq
(13) is an instance of the more general scheme (14).
(14) M, rdÑ{yÑs |ù ˛xφpx, yÑq iU there is a d P D with
Rpd, dÑq ^M, rd{x, dÑ{yÑs |ù φpx, yÑq
The diUerence between (13) and (14) is the following. In (14), the element d is
required to stand in the relation R to the sequence dÑ, where R is an n-ary
relation on the domain D so that D can be taken as structured. By contrast, in
(13) one has the special case of a Wat individual domain admitting of “random
access”, where R is the universal relation. In view of this, (13) and (14) can also
be formulated as (15a) and (15b), where R is a binary relation between elements
of D and Vnite sequences from D.
(15) a. M,v |ù Dxφpxq iU there exists a variable assignment v1 which diUers
from v at most in its assignment of a value to x s.t. M,v1 |ù φpxq.
b. M,v |ù ˛xφpx, y1, . . . , ynq iU there exists a variable assignment v1
which diUers from v at most in its assignment of a value to x s.t.
Rpv1pxq, v1py1q, . . . , v1pynqq andM,v1 |ù φpx, y1, . . . , ynq where
y1, . . . , yn are all (and just the) free variables of ˛xφ listed in alphabetic
order.
Even (15b) can be generalized to (15c) where not only unary but n-ary modal
operators are considered.
(15) c. M,v |ù ˛x1, . . . , xmφpx1, . . . , xm; y1, . . . , ynq iU there exists a vari-
able assignment v1 which diUers from v at most in its assignment of
a value to x1, . . . , xm s.t. Rpv1pxq, . . . , v1pxmq; v1py1q, . . . , v1pynqq and
M,v1 |ù φpx1, . . . , xm, y1, . . . , ynq where y1, . . . , yn are all (and just
the) free variables of ˛xφ listed in alphabetic order.
Van Benthem & Alechina (1997: 1) comment: “When generalized quantiVers are
viewed as Vrst-order operators binding Vrst-order variables, it becomes clear that
a variable bound by a generalized quantiVer cannot in general take any possible
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value. Its range is restricted, and this restriction can be deVned using an acces-
sibility relation.”
In (15a) the value of the variable x does not depend on the values of other
variables, or, in terms of elements of the domain, the value of x can be chosen
independently of the choice of the value of any other variable. In this respect
‘late’ is similar to the existential and the universal quantiVer.
(16) Dt.lateptq
However, in contrast to the two standard quantiVers, its interpretation is non-
relational in the sense that no dependencies between or accessibility to other
time points need to be taken into account. If ‘late’ is modiVed by ‘already’, the
perspective changes. One is no longer interested in the property ‘late’ being
simply true at a parameter point t0, say at speech time. Rather, the interest is
restricted to those developments leading up to t0 such that the truth value of ‘late’
is distributed on those developments in a particular way determined by ‘already’.
Thus, one switches from a non-relational to a relational perspective on which
not only single points but relations between points (or points and sequences of
points) are taken into consideration. The Vrst main thesis now is (17).
(17) Thesis I: The general format for PQ is the quantiVcational scheme in (15c).
(17) raises the question of what semantic and cognitive restrictions can be put on
the accessibility relation R. From what has been said it follows that there are at
least two diUerent layers (or dimensions).
(18) a. non-relational: static
b. relational : dynamic
Consequently, there are basically three types of relations that can be relevant.
(19) a. relations at the static level
b. relations at the dynamic level
c. relations between the static and the dynamic level
Relations of type (19c) can be used for zooming in the sense of Blackburn & De Ri-
jke (1997) and Finger & Gabbay (1992). On this perspective, the non-relational
layer is used to provide information about the relational layer. At the relational
level, objects can be seen as atomic objects with no internal structure, except for
those structures that can be deVned in terms of relations between those objects,
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i. e. in terms of relations of type (19b). By contrast, by using relations of type
(19c), objects of the relational layer are described in a more Vne-grained way by
objects of a diUerent sort.
In the context of already and still the domain D can be taken to be two-sorted,
consisting of a sort of states and a sort of sequences of states.5 For temporal
uses of already and still the sort of states can be taken to be time points and
the sort of sequences are intervals. For spatial uses, as in Basel liegt schon in
der Schweiz, states are (spatial) points in the topological sense and the sort of se-
quences consists of paths. The two diUerent sorts can be related in diUerent ways.
For example, in the temporal case, 13 possible relations, including equality, during
and after, can be distinguished for two diUerent intervals. For time points, there
are three diUerent relations: before, equal and after. Finally, and most importantly,
in the present context, there are Vve relations that can hold between a point and
an interval: before, beginning point, during, ending point and after. In the case of
already and still there are three diUerent types of relations one is interested in.
At the level of intervals, the required relation is meet. For the relation between
points and intervals the two relations are during and ending point.
For each sort, there is a particular logic (or language) to talk about elements of
the domain and relations holding between those elements. In addition, and most
importantly, it must be possible to deVne relations between the two layers. The
two layers are connected by two types of shifting operations (see e. g. De Rijke
1994), corresponding to the two possible types of relations in (19c).
(20) a. static levelÑ dynamic level: modes (i. e. non-relational properties are
analyzed in a ‘wider’ context, e. g. by describing how they ‘develop’ on
a scale)
b. dynamic levelÑ static level: projections (one passes from a relational
view to the evaluation at a particular point)
A possible choice for the relational layer is Arrow Logic (Van Benthem 1994)6.
The basic operation of Arrow Logic is the following composition operation.
(21) Cx, yzx is a ‘composition’ of y and z (or, alternatively, x can be
‘decomposed’ into y and z)
The basic modal operator of an appropriate modal propositional language for
expressing properties of (sets of) arrows is ‚, whose satisfaction condition is (22).
5 See Balbiani et al. (2011) and the two appendices for details.
6 See Appendix A for details.
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(22) M,x |ù φ ‚ ψ iU there exist y, z with Cx, yz andM,y |ù φ andM, z |ù ψ
Having the notion of an arrow together with the possibility of modeling in ad-
dition the internal structure of arrows in terms of other sorts of objects, makes
it possible to use this notion as a generalization for diUerent types of objects, in
particular for Löbner’s notion of a phase. Three examples are given in (23).
(23) temporal: intervals
spatial (topological) : physical path
conceptual: property
What type of second layer is used depends on the kind of objects that is modeled
by an arrow. For example, in the case of properties only a beginning and an end
point are distinguished without any internal structure. Next, I will illustrate this
two-layered architecture by analyzing already.
The composition operation C can be used to decompose an arrow into two
arrows which are sequentially related to each other (relation of type (19b)). Thus,
x in (22) is an admissible interval as deVned by Löbner, whereas y and z are the
two adjacent phases into which this interval can be split. UsingC and the relation
D (deVned in the appendix), ‘already’ can be deVned as (26a). If p “‘late’, one gets
(24b).
(24) a. M, s |ù alreadyppq iU there are x, y, z s.t.
(i) Cx, yz,
(ii) Dpz, sq,
(iii)M,y |ùM,y |ù IntpG pq and
(iv)M, z |ù IntpGpq
b. M, s |ù alreadyplateq iU there are x, y, z s.t.
(i) Cx, yz,
(ii) Dpz, sq,
(iii)M,y |ùM,y |ù IntpG plateqq and
(iv)M, z |ù IntpGplateqq
According to (24b), ‘already late’ is true at a parameter point s just in case s
belongs to an arrow (phase) z which is the right part of an arrow x s.t. during
z ‘late’ is constantly true (with the possible exception of the left point) and during
the left part y of x ‘late’ is constantly false (again with the possible exception of
the left point). As it stands, (24) is not quite satisfactory. For example, it does
not account for a sentence like (25), since in this case there is no phase before the
parameter point during which ‘not rich’ holds.
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(25) Er war schon reich, als er geboren wurde.
This shortcoming can be remedied by using the weak Until-operator. This oper-
ator is compatible with the fact that its second argument, here p, constantly holds
on the Vrst phase. As a consequence, no border crossing needs to be involved.
(26) M, s |ù alreadyppq iU there are x, y, z s.t. (i) Cx, yz , (ii) Dpz, sq , (iii)
M,y |ùM,y |ù Intp pWpq and (iv)M, z |ù IntpGpq
(26) still makes an assertion about what holds after the parameter point so that
already has a futurate meaning, which is empirically not adequate (see Löbner
1989 for arguments and details). In this case one requires that the parameter
point has to be the end point of the second phase.
(27) M, s |ù alreadyppq iU there is an x s.t. (i) RP px, sq and (ii)
M,x |ù Intp pWpq ‚ IntpGpq
Thus, on the present account, already and still semantically function as lifts (or
shifts), i. e. they lift non-relational properties to relational ones. The semantic,
or truth-conditional, eUect of this lift consists in evaluating a static property not
only with respect to a single state but with respect to a sequence of states of
which this state is an element.
From what has been said so far it may seem that the relation between the two
standard quantiVers and already and still has been lost. In order to show that
this view is not correct, I will begin by considering the semantic automata from
section (1.2) again.
3.2 Safety and liveness properties
There is another way of looking at the automata in Figure 2 and Figure 3. In the
case of all and still the “border crossing” leads to a fail state or non-accepting
state, i. e. the sentence is false. Thus, this state must not be attained after the
automaton started at the initial state. By contrast, for some and already the border
crossing is necessary in order to prove (the truth of) the sentence. Generalizing
this observation, one gets:
• a property constantly holds (no “bad” thing happens) all, still
• a property which (possibly) fails to hold during an initial phase eventually
comes to hold after some time (a “good” thing happens) some, already
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No such border crossing is involved in the case of unmodiVed late (or early)
because it is a non-relational property. The above two kinds of properties can
be deVned in Temporal Logic.
A safety property is a property stating that “something bad does never happen.”
These properties are expressed by formulas of the form (28).
(28) ψ Ñ Gφ
In (28) φ is a propositional formula, i. e., a formula that does not contain any tem-
poral operators. Intuitively, a safety property says that φ constantly or invariantly
holds. If ψ ” true, (28) is reduced to (29).
(29) Gφ
A liveness property states that “something good will happen”. These properties
can be deVned by (30).
(30) ψ Ñ Fφ
If in (30) ψ “  φ, a border crossing occurs. Similarly to safety properties, φ
must not contain any temporal operators. Not all properties are safety or liveness
properties. It is possible to combine the two kinds. An example is given in (31),
assuming thatW is taken as basic.
(31) ψ Y φ ” pψWφq ^ Fφ
In (31) ψ Y φ is a safety property whereas Fφ is a liveness property.
Anticipating the discussion in section (3.4), one can say that combinations of
safety and liveness properties, in particular if they involve the Until-operator, can
be used to express dependence relations because they either say that a property is
invariant (over a certain interval) or that its value has changed after some phase
during which it didn’t hold. They therefore admit to view a property not only at a
particular point (or state), i. e. in isolation, but to consider it in a broader context
in which its relation to other the valuation at other states is taken into account
as well.
3.3 Standard quantiVers as operations on scales
Recall that type x1y quantiVers in natural language live on a set A (Peters &
Westerstahl 2006: 89).
(32) If Q is a type x1y quantiVer,M a universe and A any set, then QM ’lives
on’ A iU, for all B ĎM , one has QM pBq Ø QM pAXBq.
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This property is a characteristic trait of restricted quantiVers. If QM lives on
A, knowing for any subset B of M whether or not the quantiVer holds of it
reduces to looking at those elements of B which also belong to A. For type x1, 1y
quantiVers like all or some, it is possible to freeze the restriction argument as
follows (Peters & Westerstahl 2006: 110).
(33) If Q is any type x1, 1y quantiVer, and A is any set, the type x1y quantiVer
QA is deVned, for allM and all B ĎM , by pQAqM pBq Ø QAYM pA,Bq.
The eUect of freezing is to reduce a type x1, 1y quantiVer to a type x1y quantiVer.
By holding the restrictor argument constant (or freezed), it becomes possible to
view it as a scale with respect to which elements of B (or A X B due to the
property of living on) can be checked, whether they satisfy the required property
or not. On this scale, either a ‘good’ thing happens or no ‘bad’ thing happens.
In particular, one gets (34), where p is the property corresponding to the set B.
(34) a. @ : Gp (safety property: no border crossing)
b. D : Fp (liveness property: border crossing)
We are now able to characterize the similarities and diUerences between the vari-
ous forms of phase quantiVcation.
(35) Thesis II: Common to all types of phase quantiVcation is the fact that the
truth conditions can be deVned in terms of combinations of safety- and
liveness properties of sequences or, more generally, arrows.
The various types diUer in at least the following two respects.
• The standard quantiVers @ and D are always deVned.7
• The standard quantiVers @ and D are permutation invariant.
As I will now show, these two diUerences are not independent of each other. As
was shown in section (2.1), already does not require that there be an initial phase
during which  p holds (36a). However, it is admissible only if this possibility
exists, at least theoretically (36b,c). Similarly, still imposes the condition that p
eventually becomes false, otherwise it, too, is not admissible (37).
(36) a. Er war schon reich, als er geboren wurde.
b. # Das Auto ist schon neu.
c. # Es ist schon früh.
7 Possible counterexamples are empty restrictor sets as in ‘All unicorns are tall’.
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(37) a. # Er war noch alt, als er starb.
b. # Es ist noch spät.
These constraints are not imposed by the two standard quantiVers. For example,
D is compatible with the fact that all elements of the domain have the property
expressed by p, i. e. one has Gp for all enumerations x. By contrast, if Gp holds
for all xs, then already is not admissible. This diUerence can be explained if one
considers the diUerences with respect to the cognitive signiVcance of (combina-
tions of) safety and liveness properties. This diUerence is the topic of the next
section.
3.4 The cognitive signiVcance of phase quantiVcation
When viewed from the point of view of cognitive linguistics, the most important
question with respect to modiVers like ‘already’ and ‘still’ is: what do they add in
addition to the simple assertion that p holds at the parameter point t? What are
the consequences in processing the modiVed sentence in the brain? Only getting
the information that it is late at the parameter point, solely conveys information
about that particular point. It does neither give him/her information about what
happened before nor about what is likely to happen afterwards with respect to the
property of being late. Thus, there is an epistemic or informational uncertainty
for the comprehender about what happened before t and about what is likely to
happen after t with respect to the truth value of ‘late’. Such information is not
provided by (unmodiVed) ‘late’.
What is the cognitive relevance (signiVcance) of resolving such epistemic un-
certainties? First, there is a gain in the amount of information the comprehender
gets. For example, (s)he not only knows that it is late at the parameter point but
that during some interval (phase) before that point it was not late. Second, this
gain in information can be used for strategic planning or to revise and adapt one’s
current projections (or expectations) of how a discourse (or a piece of communi-
cation) will continue. Simplifying somewhat, one can summarize the cognitive
function of ‘already’ and ‘still’ as follows: resolving epistemic uncertainties al-
lows a comprehender to eliminate certain possibilities of how a result came about
or how it will continue to hold or develop. This helps reducing both process-
ing and memory load during semantically parsing a sentence in the brain. Let’s
consider the examples in (38), some of which have been discussed before.
(38) a. Peter verfügt über ein Millionenvermögen. Er wurde schon reich geboren.
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b. The Smiths have had a baby girl. They already have two sons.
c. # Es ist schon früh.
d. # Es ist noch spät.
When a comprehender comes to know that Peter is rich, he does not know how
he acquired his riches.8 The second sentence in (40a) provides additional informa-
tion. He might have inherited his money from his parents or some other source.
A possible, though defeasible, conclusion that can be derived from this additional
information is: probably, his riches are not due to his own achievements. An anal-
ogous argument applies to (40b). Upon learning that the Smiths have had a baby
girl, I don’t know how many children they have. Or, to put it in game-theoretical
terms: I don’t know the exact number of children in the “Smiths having children”
game. In the case of (40c) and (40d) composition of the corresponding game with
another game does not result in a gain of information or a reduction in epistemic
uncertainty. For example, if it is early in the morning at the parameter point,
then it has been early for all other points belonging to the interval denoted by
‘this morning’ preceding the parameter point. As a consequence, no new infor-
mation is provided about how this state came about so that this information is
redundant at the cognitive level.
Thus, after lifting ‘late’ to a relational property, its truth value at the parameter
point t0 depends on the truth value assigned to this property on a sequence (or
arrow) the end point of which is t0, or, to put it diUerently, only those assignments
of the value ‘true’ to the property at t0 are admissible that also have yk “ false
for 1 ď k ď m and yj “ true for m ` 1 ď j ď n for some m with n the
length of the sequence and t0 being one of the yj . Thus, the value of t0 (true
in this case) is dependent on the values of the sequence yÑ : Rpx, yÑq. On this
perspective, elements of the already-group not only lift a non-relational property
to a relational one, but, in addition, they exclude some possible relations. As an
eUect, the relation R must not be the universal one, i. e. admit of random access,
because in that case no (new) information would be added by triggering this lift.
By contrast, for the standard quantiVers, the cognitive relevance does not con-
sist in eliminating epistemic uncertainty but rather in establishing (or building
up) relations between the values of diUerent attributes which have been learned
in encounters with the world. They express relations between the values of diUer-
ent properties, whereas already and still express relations between the value of a
8 Of course, one has to assume that the comprehender does not already have information about this
point of Peter’s life. Otherwise, he would get no new information.
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single property at diUerent states. Therefore, it does not matter whether the do-
main is ordered and whether some ways of bringing about the truth are excluded.
These constraints only apply if a single property is viewed at diUerent states. The
above considerations are summarized in the table below.
type of property relation
late atomic non-relational
all safety relation between
values of dierent
propertiessome liveness
still(late)
combination of
safety and liveness
relation between
the values of a
single property
at dierent states
already
(late)
combination of
safety and liveness
Table 1
The property of border crossing refers to the type of property. Safety proper-
ties forbid such a border crossing, whereas (combinations of) safety and liveness
properties require it. For atomic properties, the concept of border crossing does
not apply.
4 Phase quantiVcation and frame Theory
In this Vnal section I will relate the analysis of Section 3 to the frame theory
that is being developed in the CRC 991 ‘The Structure of Representations’ at
the University of Düsseldorf, the huge and international project led by Sebas-
tian Löbner. This theory will henceforth be called the Düsseldorf Frame Model.
Following Barsalou (1992), Löbner (2014) argues for the following two claims: (i)
the human cognitive system operates with one general format of representations
and (ii) if the human cognitive system operates with one general format of rep-
resentations, this format is essentially a Barsalou frame. This Barsalou-Löbner
Frame-Hypothesis (BLFH) requires a frame model that is suXciently expressive
to capture the diversity of representations and that is suXciently precise and re-
strictive in order to be testable. Given these two constraints, it follows that the
gap between cognitive linguistics, brain science and formal semantics has to be
256
Phase quantiVcation and frame Theory
Vlled (Naumann & Petersen 2013). A formalization of the BLFH was presented in
Petersen (2007). In this formalization linguistic items, or the concepts expressed
by them, like sortal nouns, say bottle or dog, are modeled as typed feature struc-
tures (see Petersen 2007 for details). For example, a possible frame for the sortal
noun ‘bottle’ is given in Figure 4 (this Vgure is taken from Gamerschlag et al.
2014, see Löbner 2014 for the reference).
bole
volume
height
weight
body
neck
cork
stopper
wine
store
liquids
glas
sweet
red
Italy
VOLUME
HEIGHT
WEIGHT
BODY
NECK
CLOSURE
CONTENT
PURPOSE
MATERIAL
MATERIAL
TASTE
COLOR
ORIGIN
Figure 4
According to Löbner (2014), such a frame is a parameterized description of an
object. The basic building blocks are attribute-value pairs. Attributes are func-
tions which are deVned for a certain type of possessor and which assign to every
possessor of the appropriate type a unique value from a set of admissible values.
For example, the attribute COLOR assigns possible colour values to the objects
of type ‘visible (monochrome) object’. In the speciVc bottle example above, the
attribute CONTENT speciVes that the bottle contains wine whose origin is Italy
(value of the attribute ORIGIN) and which tastes sweet (value of the attribute
TASTE). Value speciVcations can be more or less speciVc, depending either on
the amount of information that is available about the object or on the level of
abstraction at which the object is described. Frames like that in Figure 4 can be
taken as representing an atemporal or static (partial) snapshot of a bottle. What
is not captured is the possibility that the value of an attribute may eventually be
changed, say as the eUect of an action or an event, or simply by the passing of
time.
In Naumann (2013) frames in the Düsseldorf Frame Model were called Petersen
Frames. They were formalized as pointed Kripke-models in the following way.
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Given a signature xP,Attry, a Petersen Frame Model (PFM) is a triple as given
in (39).
(39) xS, tRauaPAttr, s0, V y with
• S a (non-empty) set of nodes (or states), the domain of the model,
• each Ra is a (functional) binary relation on S,
• V is a valuation function that assigns to each p P P a subset of S,
• s0 is the central node of the frame.
An example of a language for talking about PFMs is an extended modal language
(see Naumann 2013 and Naumann & Petersen 2013 for details). However, this
formalization of frames raises at least the following two serious issues: (i) if
frames can be reduced to a particular type of feature structures, what is speciVc
about a theory of frames, or, to put it diUerently, is there really a genuine theory
of frames, and (ii) in what exactly does the cognitive signiVcance of frames lie?
From the perspective of the approach developed in Section 3, the situation can
be analyzed as follows. In previous formalizations of the BLFH only the truth-
conditional dimension of frames has been taken into consideration. However, if
truth conditions are taken as primary, the semantic value of a lexical item is re-
duced to (or is completely determined by) its contribution to the truth conditions
of sentences.9 For example, in standard Tarskian semantics, the meaning of an
expression in formal semantics is usually identiVed with the (constant) contribu-
tion it makes to the truth conditions of sentences in which it occurs. For example,
intransitive verbs like run or adjectives like late or cool denote sets of entities like
persistent objects (run) or time points (late). By contrast, in a dynamic setting
like Dynamic Predicate Logic (DPL), expressions are interpreted as (generalized)
relations between (information) states.
(40) λxλsλs1.||Expr||pxqpsqps1q
However, in DPL atomic predicates like ‘run’ or ‘late’ are interpreted as tests, i. e.
the input and the output state are identical so that their meaning can be reduced
to that in a static (standard) Tarskian framework.
(41) λxλsλs1.||Expr||pxqpsqps1q ^ s “ s1
In the formal framework developed in section 3 adjectives like late or coo are
basically analyzed as properties of states (or time points). As a consequence,
9 Thus, the additional meaning components do not consists in intersentential relations (anaphora)
as in DRT or Dynamic Predicate Logic.
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their meaning can be identiVed with the contribution they make to the meaning
(truth conditions) of a sentence in which they occur. However, given the way
modiVers like already and still are analyzed in section 3, those adjectives are
usually interpreted in a higher or lifted type. Intuitively, at this level the meaning
corresponds to what Löbner calls an admissible interval. Using the distinction
between a static and a dynamic component, the question becomes: how can a
static component be integrated into a dynamic one?
One way of arriving at such an integration or combination consists in using the
technique of combining systems (Finger & Gabbay 1992, De Rijke 1994). In such
frameworks a global and a local component (layer) are distinguished. Models
have the formM “ xSg, . . .y with the global component given by the ‘. . . ’. The
set Sg represents the local component. Sg is a set tmiuiPI . Each mi can itself
be a model, and thus having a complex structure. In the setting of the Düsseldorf
Frame Model the local layer, i. e. Sg , corresponds to the static dimension and
therefore consists of a set of PFMs, which captures atemporal snapshots of an
object or entity. The global component models the dynamic layer and is given by
the arrow-models from section 3. The global-local distinction is paralleled by a
(possible) distinction with respect to the languages (or logics) that are used to talk
about the two layers (De Rijke 1994: 174). First, there is a global language which
talks about global aspects of the structure but not about local ones. Second, there
is a local language which is used to describe elements of Sg .
For PQ, a combined model can be deVned as follows.
(42) A Dynamic Frame Model (DFM) is a triple xtP fuf PF , R,ASy such that
• the elements of P g are PFMs10,
• AS is an arrow structure which is used to describe how the objects
denoted by elements of P g change,
• R is a relation on P g ˆAˆ P g which
combines the local with the global layer. Intuitively, pm,x,m1q P R if
‘executing’ an arrow in inputm results inm1 as output11,
• values of attributes in a PFM represent the values of a properties of a
possessor before a change occurred. PFMs are static in the sense that
only the contribution to the truth conditions of sentences is captured.
10 The domain of Petersen frame models will be ordered by a subsumption relation (see Carpenter
1992 for details).
11 There will in general be constraints imposed on R. For example, for a pair pm,xq, Rpm,xq is
required to be a singleton.
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A PFM is a partial description of an object and this
description is true at a parameter point just in case the object exhibits
the values of those properties expressed by attributes in the PFM.
• a DMF represents the evolution of a property (or a set
of properties) of an object with respect to a particular dimension (or a
set of dimensions) and is therefore relational.
In the context of PQ, examples for arrow models are
• events or actions which change the value of a property (or the values of a
set of properties) of an object.
• the Wow (or passage) of time. On this perspective, arrows can be taken as
time intervals.
• physical paths connecting regions (or points) in space (or space-time).
Arrows are a separate domain of the model and must therefore not be identiVed
with binary relations on the domain Sg . Thus, one has pm,x,m1q ‰ pm,x1,m1q
if x ‰ x1. By contrast, were R be deVned as a binary relation on Sg , one would
have pm,m1q “ pm,m1q, which trivially holds.
So far no constraints have been imposed on the relation R, i. e. R can be an
arbitrary relation on P g ˆ A ˆ P g . A Vrst, and obvious, constraint imposes
the correct core frame-semantical meaning. For example, in the case of late any
admissible transition must end in a PFM for which the value of the attribute
TIME is ‘late’ (or φlate). By itself, late does not impose any further conditions.
As a consequence, it is compatible with any transition that ends in a ‘late’-state.
The contribution of modiVers like already or still, then, consists in restricting
this model to a submodel where each transition is admissible according to the
constraints imposed by the modiVer.
When taken together, one arrives at the following four hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: The core frame-semantical meaning of an expression includes its
(standard) static Tarskian meaning which is deVned in terms of the contribution it
makes to the truth conditions of sentences. This meaning component is captured
in terms of PFMs.12
Hypothesis 2: The proper frame-semantical meaning of an expression is deVned
in terms of DFMs, which specify possible ways of how the core feature-semantical
meaning, expressing its contribution to truth conditions of sentences, can be
12 This last claim need not necessarily hold for dynamic or action verbs like eat or hit.
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brought about. This is its dynamic meaning component and is part of its cognitive
meaning.
Hypothesis 3: The frame-semantical meaning of an expression can be given in
terms of DTM-formulas of the form pi Ñ ˛RPφ where pi is a formula of the
global language expressing how the truth came about and φ expresses the (static)
truth conditions. Such a formula is satisVed by an arrow if it satisVes pi and the
truth conditions expressed by φ are true at its right (end) point (boundary). For
example, in the case of late one gets (43).
(43) M,x |ù Intp late W lateq ‚ IntpGplateqq Ñ ˛RP late
(43) expresses a relationship between the dynamic level of an arrow and its static
component. (43) can be read as “if an arrow x can be decomposed into subarrows
y and z satisfying pi, then φ holds at the end point of the arrow”.
Hypothesis 4: Identical contributions to truth conditions modeled by the same
PFM can correspond to diUerent DFMs capturing the dynamic (cognitive) mean-
ing of the expression (or concept).
Core frame-semantical meanings are expressed in terms of the language that is
used to talk about PFMs, e. g. an extended modal language (see Naumann 2013 for
details). The proper frame-semantical meaning is expressed in terms of the lan-
guage used for talking about the global layer of a DFM. For phase quantiVcation,
this is the language deVned in section 3.
Of course, phase quantiVcation is an example of this fourth hypothesis: It is al-
ready late, It is still late and It is late have the same truth conditions (it must be late
at the parameter point or at speech time), however the constraints they impose at
the level of DFM are diUerent. Using Hypothesis 3 their diUerence consists in the
DFM formula pi while they all have the same formula ˛RPφ in the consequent,
expressing the fact that the sentences have the same truth conditions. Depend-
ing on pi, diUerent types of information about the way the truth conditions have
come about are conveyed by the sentences. As a consequence, diUerent (addi-
tional) conclusions, like those discussed in section 3.4, can be inferred, reWecting
the diUerence in their cognitive value (or in their cognitive meaning).
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Appendix A: Arrow logic and two-layered systems
Arrow Logic13 is based on the intuition that binary relations can be interpreted
as denoting sets of arrows. Examples are arcs in graphs, transitions in Labeled
Transition Systems, attributes in attribute-value structures or even preferences if
they are used as ranking relations. Arrows can have internal structure so that
they need not be identiVed with ordered pairs because diUerent arrows can have
the same source (beginning point) and target (end point). Conversely, there may
be points that are not related by arrows. An arrow frame is deVned as follows.
(1) Arrow frames are tuples pA,C,R, Iq with
a. A a (non-empty) set of objects (‘arrows’)
13 See van Van Benthem (1994) and the references cited therein for details.
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b. C, x, yz x is a ‘composition’ of y and z
c. Rx, y y is a ‘reversal’ of x
d. Ix x is an ‘identity’ arrow
If a propositional valuation V is added to such a frame, one gets an arrow model
with the following satisfaction relation.
(2) a. M,x |ù p iU x P V ppq
b. M,x |ù  φ iU notM,x |ù φ
c. M,x |ù φ^ ψ iUM,x |ù ψ andM,x |ù ψ
d. M,x |ù φ ‚ ψ iU there exist y, z with Cx, yz,M, y |ù φ andM, z |ù ψ
e. M,x |ù φ˝ iU there exists y with Rx, y andM,y |ù φ
f. M,x |ù Id iU Ix
Arrow frames (models) are combined with state frames (models).
(3) State frames are pairs pS,ďq with
1. a (non-empty) set of states
2. ď a partial (or linear) order on S
There are the following mechanisms of interaction (bridges) connecting the two
components.
(4) a. LP Ď Aˆ S, mapping an arrow to its beginning (or left) point.
b. RP Ď Aˆ S, mapping an arrow to its end (or right) point.
Both LP and RP are required to be functional, i. e. both LP pxq and RP pxq are
singletons. In terms of LP and RP the relationD (‘during’) between arrows and
states is deVned as follows.
(5) Dpx, sq iU LP pxq ă s ď RP pxq
To LP and RP correspond the two modalities deVned in (6).
(6) a. M,x |ù ˛LPφ iUM,LP pxq |ù φ
b. M,x |ù ˛RPφ iUM,RP pxq |ù φ
Since one is mainly interested in the lifting of non-relational properties that can
be expressed using one of the variants of the Until-operator, state formulas are
evaluated on sequences γ “ s0s1 . . . sk in such a way that an atomic formula p
is true on a sequence if it is true at its beginning point s0, (7a). In (7b)-(7c) the
clauses for Int, corresponding to D, as well as for G and F are given.
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(7) a. M,γ |ù p iUM, s0 |ù p for p a state propositional variable
b. M,x |ù Intpφq iUM,Dpxq |ù φ
c. M,γ |ù Gpφq iU for all suXxes γ1 of γ: M,γ1 |ù φ
d. M,γ |ù F pφq iU for some suXx γ1 of γ: M,γ1 |ù φ
The deVnition of the Until-operator U is given in (8a). In (8b) the weak variantW
of the Until-operator is deVned. It is compatible with φ being constantly true.
(8) a. M, s |ù ψUφ iU there is an s1 with s ă s1 andM, s1 |ù φ and for all s2
with s ă s2 ă s1: M, s2 |ù ψ.
b. ψWφ ” pψUφq _Gφ
The intuitive meaning of the two variants are given in (9) (see Kröger & Merz
2008: 66).
(9) a. “There is a strictly subsequent state in which φ holds, and ψ holds until
that state.”
b. “ψ does not become false before a state where φ holds is reached.” (“ψ
waiting for φ”)
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